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STICERD Economic Theory Seminars

Self-Prospecting: Optimal Experimentation Under Present-Bias

Nikhil Vellodi (PSE), joint with Polina Borisova

Thursday 23 October 2025 15:30 - 17:00

Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public. Please ensure you have informed the event contact as early as possible.

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.


About this event

A present-biased decision maker (DM) faces a two-armed bandit problem whose risky arm generates random payoffs at exponentially distributed times. Under full information, the DM's belief remains unchanged prior to payoff arrivals, generating a ``lumpy' belief process that updates infrequently but conclusively. Our main finding is that coarsening the DM's information to foster ``gradual optimism' - a continuously increasing path of beliefs during active experimentation - helps motivate the DM more effectively and deliver them greater welfare. We relate our findings to those in behavioral psychology relating to motivation, learning, and self-control, and apply our results to parenting and pedagogy.

Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, both ONLINE and IN PERSON in SAL 3.05.

Seminar organisers: Dr Paula Ferreira Onuchic and Dr Christopher Sandmann.

For further information please contact Sadia Ali: s.ali43@lse.ac.uk.

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