STICERD Industrial Organisation Seminars
Public Procurement vs. Regulated Competition in Selection Markets
Jose Ignacio Cuesta (Stanford), joint with Pietro Tebaldi
Monday 15 June 2026 12:00 - 13:30
SAL 2.04, 2nd Floor Conference Room, Sir Arthur Lewis Building, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.
Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public. Please ensure you have informed the event contact as early as possible.
Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.
About this event
A common approach to markets with adverse selection is to regulate competition to minimize inefficiencies, while preserving consumer choice among firms. We study the role of procurement auctions—leading to sole provision by the winning firm—as an alternative market design. Relative to regulated competition, auctions affect product variety, quality, markups, and remove cream-skimming incentives. We develop a framework to study this comparison and apply it to individual health insurance in the US. We find that procurement auctions would increase consumer welfare in most markets, mainly by limiting inefficiencies from adverse selection and market power, and by increasing quality.
Industrial Organisation seminars are held on Mondays in term time at 12:00-13:30, in person in SAL 2.04, unless specified otherwise.
Seminar organiser: Alessandro Gavazza.
For further information please contact Sadia Ali: s.ali43@lse.ac.uk.
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This event will take place in SAL 2.04, 2nd Floor Conference Room, Sir Arthur Lewis Building, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH.
The building is labelled SAL on the map. Enter the building via Lincoln's Inn Fields.
