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Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events.

Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public. Please ensure you have informed the event contact as early as possible.

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.

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About this event

Both electoral competition within jurisdictions and geographical competition between them are capable of forcing political representatives to act in the interest of voters. How do these forms of competition interact to affect the quality of governance? We investigate this question theoretically. The model posits that local officials provide governance quality to compete for residents against other jurisdictions, and for votes against other candidates in their jurisdiction. Further, some voters are moderates: they value governance quality but not partisanship of officials. Others are partisans: they value both governance quality and the partisanship of officials. The analysis reveals that geographical and electoral competition can interact to undermine the quality of governance. When partisan representatives govern poorly, voters migrate out. The remaining electorate is both smaller and more partisan. This weakens incentives of political challengers to run for office, thereby promoting incumbents' electoral security.