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Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events.

Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public. Please ensure you have informed the event contact as early as possible.

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.

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About this event

We analyze n-player continuous-time repeated games with imperfect monitoring in which public signals about players? actions are driven by Brownian motion. Extending the two-player framework of Sannikov (2007), we characterize the set of perfect public equilibria and the associated equilibrium payoffs. Our analysis yields two optimality equations: an elliptic partial differential equation and a parabolic one. Under mild as- sumptions on the monitoring technology and the payoff structure, the support function of the equilibrium payoff set is the greatest viscosity solution of the elliptic equation, although uniqueness may fail. By contrast, the parabolic equation admits a unique viscosity solution. As the time parameter tends to infinity, this solution converges to the support function of the set of equilibrium payoffs. In contrast to the two-player case, games with three or more players exhibit new equilibrium phenomena, including ab- sorbing regimes that do not correspond to static Nash equilibria.