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STICERD Work in Progress Seminars

Civilian-militant model

Sutanuka Roy (Department of Economics, LSE)

Friday 14 February 2014 13:00 - 14:00

This event will take place online.

Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as online seminars or as online and in person. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

Unless otherwise specified, current restrictions mean in-person seminars are only open to members of the LSE community (those with a valid LSE ID card).

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom.

About this event

I present a model of civil war where citizens revolt against an incumbent state. The citizens are grouped as high income and low income.I will focus on the effects of public good provision, income inequality in triggering civil war. The main contributions of the paper are the following findings. Irrespective of any institution high common interest spending would deter conflict, moderate level of spending on public goods would cause any one of the citizen group to fight and low level of spending on public good would cause both citizen groups to fight together against the state. However, if the society is highly unequal in income, level of public spending that is required to deter conflict may not be feasible in good institution. On the other hand in bad institution, inequality of income plays no role in inciting citizens to fight against the state.

This event will take place online.