IFS-STICERD Public Economics Seminar
Who Is Screened Out? Application Costs and the Targeting of Disability Programs
Manasi Deshpandi (MIT), joint with Yue Li
Wednesday 07 March 2018 16:30 - 17:30
Due to the onging coronavirus outbreak, many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as online seminars. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.
About this event
We study the effect of application costs on the targeting of disability programs using the closings of Social Security Administration field offices, which provide assistance with filing disability applications. We find that field office closings lead to large and persistent reductions in the number of disability recipients and reduce targeting efficiency based on current eligibility standards. The number of disability recipients declines by 13% in surrounding areas, with the largest effects for applicants with moderately severe conditions and low education levels. Evidence on channels suggests that increased congestion at neighboring offices is more important than higher travel or information costs.
This seminar series is jointly organized by the IFS and STICERD.
IFS-STICERD Public Economics seminars are held on Wednesdays in term time at 16:30-17:30, ONLINE, unless specified otherwise.
Seminar organisers: Stuart Adam (IFS), Monica Costa Dias (IFS), Xavier Jaravel (LSE), Camille Landais (LSE), Attila Lindner (UCL), Joana Naritomi (LSE), and Johannes Spinnewijn (LSE).
For further information please contact Lubala Chibwe, either by email: email@example.com.
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