STICERD Economic Theory Seminars
Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms
Thomas Mariotti (Toulouse), joint with Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Alessandro Pavan
Thursday 19 May 2022 15:30 - 17:00
Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.
Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public.
Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.
About this event
We study competing-mechanism games, in which several principals contract with several privately informed agents. We show that enabling the principals to engage into private disclosures—whereby a principal sends to the agents contractible private signals about how her ﬁnal decision will respond to the agents’ messages—can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the predictions of such games. Our ﬁrst result is that equilibrium outcomes and payoﬀs of games without private disclosures may not be supported when private disclosures are allowed for. This challenges the robustness of the folk theorems `a la Yamashita (2010). Our second result is that allowing for private disclosures may generate equilibrium outcomes and payoﬀs that cannot be supported in any game without private disclosures, no matter how rich the message spaces are. This challenges the canonicity of the universal mechanisms of Epstein and Peters (1999). Together, these ﬁndings call for a novel approach to the analysis of competing-mechanism games.
Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, both ONLINE and IN PERSON in 32L 3.05.
Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Christopher Sandmann.
For further information please contact Annie-Rose Nicholas by email: email@example.com.
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