STICERD Economic Theory Seminars
Interactions across Multiple Games: Cooperation, Corruption, and Organizational Design
Nicole Immorlica (Microsoft), joint with Jonathan Bendor (Stanford), Lukas Bolte (Stanford) and Matthew O. Jackson (Stanford)
Thursday 23 March 2023 15:30 - 17:00
SAL 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, Sir Arthur Lewis Building, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.
Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public.
Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.
About this event
Teams face a variety of strategic situations. It is socially beneficial for teams to cooperate in productive but not in corrupt ones. However, cooperation in one situation may depend on expectations of cooperation in others. We identify when it is that sustaining socially desirable cooperation necessitates undesirable cooperation. We characterize how cooperation is shaped by the absolute and relative payoffs to cooperation across various tasks, as well as the frequency with which people are reshuffled across teams and whether teams can be specialized in the tasks they face.
Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, both ONLINE and IN PERSON in 32L 3.05.
Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Christopher Sandmann.
For further information please contact Sadia Ali: email@example.com.
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This event will take place in SAL 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, Sir Arthur Lewis Building, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH.
The building is labelled SAL on the map. Enter the building via Lincoln's Inn Fields.