Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Model

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Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Model

Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Model

Klaus M. Schmidt

Published 1989

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London School of Economics and Political Science
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