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Author: Andrea Prat

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Development Discussion Paper

Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work

Oriana Bandiera, Andrea Prat and Raffaella Sadun

CEOs affect the performance of the firms they manage, and family CEOs seem to weaken it. Yet little is known about what top executives actually do, and whether it differs by firm ownership. We study CEOs in the Indian ma...Read more...

Revised December 2014

Theoretical Economics Paper

Screening with an Approximate Type Space

Kristóf Madarász and Andrea Prat

We re-visit the single-agent mechanism design problem with quasi-linear preferences, but we assume that the principal knowingly operates on the basis of only an approximate type space rather than the (potentially complex...Read more...

June 2010

Theoretical Economics Paper

Spatial Asset Pricing: A First Step

Francois Ortalo-Magne and Andrea Prat

People choose where to live and how much to invest in housing. Traditionally, the first decision has been the domain of spatial economics, while the second has been analyzed in finance. Spatial asset pricing is an attemp...Read more...

April 2010

Theoretical Economics Paper

The Political Economy of Housing Supply: Homeowners, Workers, and Voters

Francois Ortalo-Magne and Andrea Prat

Equilibrium of the housing market depends on a complex set of interactions between: (1) individual location decisions; (2) individual housing investment; (3) collective decisions on urban growth. We embed these three ele...Read more...

January 2007

Political Economy and Public Policy Paper

Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability

Timothy Besley and Andrea Prat

It has long been recognized that the media play an essential role in government accountability. However, even in the absence of censorship, the government may influence news content by maintaining a “cozy” relationship w...Read more...

August 2005

Theoretical Economics Paper

The Wrong Kind of Transparency

Andrea Prat

In a model of career concerns for experts, when is the principal hurt from observing more information about her agent? This paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent's action and ...Read more...

October 2002