STICERD Economic Theory Seminars

Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public.

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.

Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, ONLINE or ONLINE AND IN PERSON at the same time.

Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Christopher Sandmann.

For further information please contact Annie-Rose Nicholas by email: a.nicholas1@lse.ac.uk.

Please use this link to subscribe or unsubscribe to the Economic Theory seminars mailing list (etheory).

Thursday 05 May 2022 15:30 - 17:00

Communication Under Scrutiny

Nemanja Antic (Kellogg, Northwestern), joint with Archishman Chakraborty and Rick Harbaugh

This event is both online and in person

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH

Thursday 12 May 2022 15:30 - 17:00

Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents

Deniz Kattwinkel (UCL), joint with Axel Niemeyer, Justus Preusser and Alexander Winter

This event is both online and in person

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH

Thursday 19 May 2022 15:30 - 17:00

Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms

We study competing-mechanism games, in which several principals contract with several privately informed agents. We show that enabling the principals to engage into private disclosures—whereby a principal sends to the ag...Read more...

Thomas Mariotti (Toulouse), joint with Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Alessandro Pavan

This event is both online and in person

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH

Thursday 26 May 2022 15:30 - 17:00

Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Information Design

Jeffrey Ely (Northwestern University), joint with George Georgiadis and Luis Rayo

This event is both online and in person

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH

Thursday 02 June 2022 15:30 - 17:00

TBC

TBC

ONLINE

Thursday 09 June 2022 15:30 - 17:00

Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information

Andreas Kleiner (Arizona State University), joint with S. Nageeb Ali and Navin Kartik

This event is both online and in person

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH

Thursday 16 June 2022 15:30 - 17:00

Incentive Design for Talent Discovery

Erik Madsen (NYU), joint with Basil Williams and Andrzej Skrzypacz

This event is both online and in person

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH

Thursday 16 June 2022 15:30 - 17:00

Incentive Design for Talent Discovery

Erik Madsen (NYU), joint with Basil Williams and Andrzej Skrzypacz

This event is both online and in person

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH

Thursday 09 June 2022 15:30 - 17:00

Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information

Andreas Kleiner (Arizona State University), joint with S. Nageeb Ali and Navin Kartik

This event is both online and in person

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH

Thursday 02 June 2022 15:30 - 17:00

TBC

TBC

ONLINE

Thursday 26 May 2022 15:30 - 17:00

Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Information Design

Jeffrey Ely (Northwestern University), joint with George Georgiadis and Luis Rayo

This event is both online and in person

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH

Thursday 19 May 2022 15:30 - 17:00

Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms

Thomas Mariotti (Toulouse), joint with Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Alessandro Pavan

This event is both online and in person

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH

Thursday 12 May 2022 15:30 - 17:00

Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents

Deniz Kattwinkel (UCL), joint with Axel Niemeyer, Justus Preusser and Alexander Winter

This event is both online and in person

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH

Thursday 05 May 2022 15:30 - 17:00

Communication Under Scrutiny

Nemanja Antic (Kellogg, Northwestern), joint with Archishman Chakraborty and Rick Harbaugh

This event is both online and in person

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH

Thursday 31 March 2022 15:30 - 17:00

TBC

TBC

ONLINE

Thursday 24 March 2022 15:30 - 17:00

Optimal Political Career Dynamics

e examine politicians’ career dynamics generated by political accountability, characterizing voter-optimal equilibrium play under repeated moral hazard. When moral hazard binds, equilibrium play is non-stationary: Re-el...Read more...

Joao Ramos (QMUL)

This event is both online and in person

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH

Thursday 17 March 2022 15:30 - 17:00

Auctions with Frictions

Stephan Lauermann (Bonn University), joint with Asher Wolinsky

This event is both online and in person

ONLINE

Thursday 10 March 2022 15:30 - 17:00

Local Evidence and Diversity in Minipublics

We study optimal minipublic design with endogenous evidence. A policymaker selects a group of citizens—a minipublic—for advice on the desirability of a policy. Citizens can discover local evidence but might be deterred b...Read more...

Arjada Bardhi (Duke University), joint with Nina Bobkova

This event is both online and in person

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH

Thursday 03 March 2022 15:30 - 17:00

Simultaneous Search and Adverse Selection

We study the effect of diminishing search frictions in markets with adverse selection by presenting a model in which agents with private information can simultaneously contact multiple trading partners. We highlight a ne...Read more...

Piero Gottardi (University of Essex), joint with Sarah Auster and Ronald Wolthoff

This event is both online and in person

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH

Thursday 24 February 2022 15:30 - 17:00

Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms

Many scarce public resources are allocated at below-market-clearing prices, and sometimes for free. Such “non-market” mechanisms necessarily sacrifice some surplus, yet they can potentially improve equity. In this paper,...Read more...

Piotr Dworczak (Northwestern University), joint with Mohammad Akbarpour and Scott Duke Kominers

This event is both online and in person

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH

Thursday 09 December 2021 15:30 - 17:00

CANCELLED

Much of the work on auction theory focuses on design aspects in situations motivated by formally organized auctions, like those held by government agencies. However, auction models are also convenient abstractions of les...Read more...

Stephan Lauermann (Bonn University), joint with Asher Wolinsky

This event is both online and in person

ONLINE

Thursday 25 November 2021 15:30 - 17:00

Dynamic persuasion and games with Incomplete Information on one side

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan (LSE)

This event is both online and in person

ONLINE

Thursday 18 November 2021 15:30 - 17:00

Making Decisions under Model Misspecification

We use decision theory to confront uncertainty that is sufficiently broad to incorporate “models as approximations.” We presume the existence of a featured collection of what we call “structured models” that have explici...Read more...

Simone Cerreia-Vioglio (Bocconi University), joint with Lars Peter Hansen, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci

This event is both online and in person

ONLINE

Thursday 18 November 2021 15:30 - 17:00

Making Decisions under Model Misspecification

Simone Cerreia-Vioglio (Bocconi University), joint with Lars Peter Hansen, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci

This event is both online and in person

ONLINE

Thursday 11 November 2021 15:30 - 17:00

Dynamic Incentives in Incompletely Specified Environments

Consider a repeated interaction where it is unknown which of various stage games will be played each period. This framework captures the logic of intertemporal incentives even though numeric payoffs to any strategy prof...Read more...

Gabriel Carroll (Stanford University)

This event is both online and in person

ONLINE

Thursday 11 November 2021 15:30 - 17:00

Dynamic Incentives in Incompletely Specified Environments

Gabriel Carroll (Stanford University)

This event is both online and in person

ONLINE

Thursday 04 November 2021 15:30 - 17:00

Screening and Information-Sharing Externalities

Quitze Valenzuela-Stookey (Duke University / UC Berkeley)

This event is both online and in person

ONLINE

View all past events