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For further information about this series and for press inquiries please contact Lubala Chibwe, by email: l.chibwe@lse.ac.uk.
Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch
This paper presents an analysis of general time preferences in the canonical Rubinstein (1982) model of bilateral alternating-offers bargaining. I derive a simple sufficient structure for optimal punishments and ther...Read more...
15 October 2015
Matt Elliott and Francesco Nava
This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. Bargaining in such markets occurs in the context of alternative possible matches that provide endogenous outside options. We ask when will such markets clear effici...Read more...
10 July 2015
Kristóf Madarász
People exaggerate the extent to which their private information is shared with others. This paper introduces this phenomenon portably into Bayesian games where people wrongly think that if they can condition their strate...Read more...
16 February 2015
Franz Dietrich and Christian List
“Reason-based rationalizations” explain an agent's choices by specifying which properties of the options or choice context he/she cares about (the “motivationally salient properties”) and how he/she cares about these pro...Read more...
4 March 2014
Timo Hiller and Timo Hiller
This paper presents a simple model of strategic network formation with local complementarities in effort levels and positive local externalities for a general class of payoff functions. Results are obtained for one-sided...Read more...
30 September 2013
Uri Gneezy, Alex Imas and Kristóf Madarász
We develop a dynamic model where people decide in the presence of moral constraints and test the predictions of the model through two experiments. Norm violations induce a temporal feeling of guilt that depreciates with ...Read more...
1 February 2012
Erik Eyster and Michele Piccione
We model a competitive market where risk-neutral traders trade one risk-free and one risky asset with limited short-selling of the risky asset. Traders use incomplete theories that give statistically correct beliefs abou...Read more...
1 December 2011
Francesco Nava and Michele Piccione
The paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated two-action games with local monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of partners, of whom he is privately informed. The main re...Read more...
1 September 2011
Leonardo Felli and Kevin Roberts
In an environment in which heterogenous buyers and sellers undertake ex-ante investments, the presence of market competition for matches provides incentives for investment but may leave inefficiencies that take the form ...Read more...
Francesco Nava and Pasquale Schiraldi
Sales are a widespread and well-known phenomenon that has been documented in several product markets. Regularities in such periodic price reductions appear to suggest that the phenomenon cannot be entirely attributed to ...Read more...
1 July 2011
Kristóf Madarász and Andrea Prat
We re-visit the single-agent mechanism design problem with quasi-linear preferences, but we assume that the principal knowingly operates on the basis of only an approximate type space rather than the (potentially complex...Read more...
June 2010
Francois Ortalo-Magne and Andrea Prat
People choose where to live and how much to invest in housing. Traditionally, the first decision has been the domain of spatial economics, while the second has been analyzed in finance. Spatial asset pricing is an attemp...Read more...
April 2010
Gilat Levy and Ronnie Razin
We propose a model of religious organizations which relies on the ability of such organizations to affect individual beliefs about the causality between actions in the social context and personal utility shocks. We show ...Read more...
November 2009
We analyze a dynamic model of agenda formation in which players compete in each period to put their ideal policies on the agenda. In each period, with some probability, a decision maker is called upon to take an action f...Read more...
September 2009
Francesco Nava
This paper investigates how quantity competition operates in economies in which a network describes the set of feasible trades. A general equilibrium model is presented in which prices and .ows of goods are endogenously ...Read more...
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Alessandro Riboni
In a Case Law regime Courts have more flexibility than in a Statute Law regime. Since Statutes are inevitably incomplete, this confers an advantage to the Statute Law regime over the Case Law one. However, all Courts rul...Read more...
August 2008
Equilibrium of the housing market depends on a complex set of interactions between: (1) individual location decisions; (2) individual housing investment; (3) collective decisions on urban growth. We embed these three ele...Read more...
January 2007
Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite
We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. The model we analyze is the same as in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006). An active court can improve on the outcome that t...Read more...
October 2006
We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title — courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows ...Read more...
Anthony Horsley and Andrew J Wrobel
This is a new formal framework for the theory of competitive equilibrium and its applications. Our “short-run approach” means the calculation of long-run producer optima and general equilibria from the short-run solution...Read more...
May 2005
The Wong-Viner Envelope Theorem on the equality of long-run and short-run marginal costs (LRMC and SRMC) is reformulated for convex but generally nondifferentiable cost functions. The marginal cost can be formalized as t...Read more...
April 2005
The “short-run approach” calculates long-run producer optima and general equilibria by building on short-run solutions to the producer’s profit maximization problem and on profit-based valuation of the fixed inputs. We o...Read more...
Sudipto Bhattacharya and Sergei Guriev
We develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development (R&D), in which one Research Unit (RU) with an innovative idea bargains to license her nonverifiable interim knowledge exclusively to one of two competi...Read more...
September 2004
Leonardo Felli and Christopher Harris
This paper introduces two complementary models of firm-specific training: an informational model and a productivity-enhancement model. In both models, market provision of firm-specific training is inefficient. However, t...Read more...
April 2004
Oliver Hart and John Moore
We view a contract as a list of outcomes. Ex ante, the parties commit not to consider outcomes not on the list, i.e., these are 'ruled out'. Ex post, they freely bargain over outcomes on the list, i.e., the contract spec...Read more...
March 2004
Gilat Levy
Public provision of private goods such as education is usually viewed as a form of redistribution in kind. However, does it arise when income redistribution is feasible as well? In this paper I analyse a two-dimensional ...Read more...
Jian Tong and Chenggang Xu
Interactions between economic development and financial development are studied by looking at the roles of financial institutions in selecting R&D projects (including for both imitation and innovation). Financial develop...Read more...
Timothy Besley and Maitreesh Ghatak
A unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private non-profits is the importance of missions, as opposed to profit, as an organizational goal. Such mission-oriented organizations...Read more...
November 2003
We find an economic rationale for the common-sense answer to the question in our title ¿ courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyse a contractual environment that allows ...Read more...
Antoine Faure-Grimaud and Soenje Reiche
This paper shows that the inability of regulators to commit to long-term contracts is irrelevant when there is some competition between regulated firms and when firms' private information is correlated. This sharply cont...Read more...
September 2003
Yingyi Qian, Gerard Roland and Chenggang Xu
We model the coordination of specialised tasks inside an organisation as 'attribute matching'. Using this method, we compare the performance of organisational forms (M-form and U-form) in implementing changes such as inn...Read more...
June 2003
In this paper I analyse how careerist judges formulate their decisions using information they uncover during deliberations as well as relevant information from previous decisions. I assume that judges have reputation con...Read more...
May 2003
Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo
In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even...Read more...
February 2003
We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract they draw up. Ex-post ...Read more...
Erzo G J Luttmer and Thomas Mariotti
We consider an exchange economy with time-inconsistent consumers whose preferences are additively separable. When these consumers trade in a sequence of markets, their time-inconsistency may introduce a non-convexity tha...Read more...
January 2003
Bruno Biais and Thomas Mariotti
We study how securities and trading mechanisms can be designed to optimally mitigate the adverse impact of market imperfections on liquidity. Asset owners seek to obtain liquidity by selling their claims on future cash-f...Read more...
Jean-Paul Decamps, Thomas Mariotti and Stephane Villeneuve
We study the decision of when to invest in an indivisible project whose value is perfectly observable but driven by a parameter that is unknown to the decision maker ex ante. This problem is equivalent to an optimal stop...Read more...
Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu
This paper studies the design of law-making and law enforcement institutions based on the premise that law is inherently incomplete. Under incomplete law, law enforcement by courts may suffer from deterrence failure, def...Read more...
December 2002
Maitreesh Ghatak, Massimo Morelli and Tomas Sjostrom
We study an economy where agents are heterogeneous in terms of observable wealth and unobservable talent. Adverse selection forces creditors to ask for collateral. We study the two-way interaction between rationing in th...Read more...
October 2002
Michele Piccione and Ariel Rubinstein
We model differences among agents in their ability to recognise temporal patterns of prices. Using the concept of DeBruijin sequences in two dynamic models of markets, we demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which ...Read more...
Andrea Prat
In a model of career concerns for experts, when is the principal hurt from observing more information about her agent? This paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent's action and ...Read more...
Nabil J Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
We develop a model of unforeseen contingencies. These are contingencies that are understood by economic agents ' their consequences and probabilities are known' but are such that every description of such events necessar...Read more...
February 2002
Heski Bar-Isaac
We consider the impact of history on the survival of a monopolist selling single units in discrete time periods, whose quality is learned slowly. If the seller learns her own quality at the same rate as customers, a suff...Read more...
October 2001
With L8 as the commodity space, the equilibrium price density is shown to be a continuous function of the commodity characteristics. The result is based on symmetry ideas from the Hardy-Littlewood-Pólya theory of rearran...Read more...
May 2001
In an environment in which both buyers and sellers can undertake match specific investments, the presence of market competition for matches may solve hold-up and coordination problems generated by the absence of complete...Read more...
Chong-En Bai and Chenggang Xu
This paper studies the effect of ownership structure on workers' incentives for investing in firm-specific human capital. Particularly, we analyse such incentivers and monitoring under employee ownership and capitalist o...Read more...
March 2001
Patrick Bolton and Chenggang Xu
This paper centres around the question of ownership of firms and managerial competition and how these affect manager and employees' incentives to invest in human capital. We argue that employee's incentives in human capi...Read more...
Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli
This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate the basic 'hold-up problem' which arises whenever the...Read more...
February 2001
This paper explores the link between boundedly rational behaviour and incomplete contracts. The bounded rationality of the agents in our world is embodied in a constraint that the contracts they write must be algorithmic...Read more...
December 2000
We apply duality methods of linear and convex programming to the problems of operation and rental valuation of facilities for conversion and storage of cyclically priced goods, e.g. , energy. Both problems are approached...Read more...
November 2000
In this paper I analyse the strategic interaction of decision makers and their advisers in a consultation process. I find that when agents are concerned about their reputation, consultation results in sub-optimal sharing...Read more...
Carlos Diaz-Moreno and Jose E. Galdon-Sanchez
In this paper, we build and structurally estimate a complete information bargaining model of collective negotiation for Spain. For large firms, the assumption of complete information seems a sensible one, and it matches ...Read more...
July 2000
Using convex calculus, we extend the Wong-Viner Theorem to nondifferentiable costs by equating the capital inputs' rental prices to their profit-imputed marginal values. Thus extended, the short-run approach to LRMC pric...Read more...
June 2000
We develop a model of hierarchies based on the allocation of authority. A firm's owners have ultimate authority over a firm's decisions, but they have limited time or capacity to exercise this authority. Hence owners mus...Read more...
October 1999
Duality methods of linear and convex programming are applied to impute definite marginal values to the fixed inputs of a hydroelectric plant from the operating profit. Our earlier analysis of pumped storage (of energy an...Read more...
Bewley's condition on production sets, imposed to ensure the existence of an equilibrium price density when L? is the commodity space, is weakened to allow applications to continuous-time problems, and especially to peak...Read more...
Godfrey Keller and Sven Rady
We study the evolution of prices in a symmetric duopoly where firms are uncertain about the degree of product differentiation. Customers sometimes perceive the products as close substitutes, sometimes as highly different...Read more...
July 1999
Kevin Roberts
This paper examines the process and outcomes of democratic decision-making in clubs where a club is defined by their sets of members whose preferences and decisions relate to the set of members in the club: the electorat...Read more...
January 1999
Eric Maskin and John Moore
The paper characterises the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism....Read more...
December 1998
Ben Lockwood and David de Meza
The standard property-rights theory of the firm assumes that prior to investing in human capital, team members meet and negotiate asset ownership. This paper endogenizes the event sequence in a matching model of market e...Read more...
We identify and investigate the basic 'hold-up problem' which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circu...Read more...
October 1998
We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the unique ...Read more...
In the last few years, a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of 'incomplete contracting'. However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous f...Read more...
September 1998
Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort
We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principal delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were ris...Read more...
July 1998
Timothy Besley and Rohini Pande
The paper studies credible information transmission by governments. A group of heterogenous individuals have to make private investment and labour supply decisions while relying on the government for information about in...Read more...
Anthony Horsley, Timothy Van Zandt and Andrew J Wrobel
We give variants on Berge's Maximum Theorem in which the lower and the upper semicontinuities of the preference relation are assumed for two different topologies on the action set, i.e., the set of actions availabe a pri...Read more...
March 1998
We are concerned with the design of a constitution for a firm - an ex ante contract which assigns residual rights of control (and possibly residual income rights) without reference to the issue to be decided. We focus at...Read more...
January 1998
Ben Polak
We show that, in games of complete information, the Aumann-Brandenburger (1995) sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in beliefs also imply common knowledge of rationality. We then consider beliefs held in games of ...Read more...
November 1997
Simon Grant, Atsushi Kajii and Ben Polak
Savage motivated his Sure-Thing Principle b y arguing that, whenever an act would be preferred if an event obtains and preferred if an event did not obtain, then it should be preferred overall. The idea that it should be...Read more...
October 1997
Boaz Moselle and Ben Polak
We provide a model of a primitive state whose rulers extort taxes for their own ends. This 'predatory' state can result in lower levels of both output and popular welfare than either organized banditry or anarchy. The pr...Read more...
September 1997
Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate
The welfare economic method for analyzing the case for government intervention is often criticised for ignoring the political determination of policies. The standard method of accounting for this critique studies the cas...Read more...
This paper studies the impact of lobbying on political competition and policy outcomes in a framework which integrates the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with the menu-auction model of lobbying. Posi...Read more...
This paper studies optimal experimentation by a monopolist who faces an unknown demand curve subject to random changes, and who maximises profits over an infinite horizon in continuous time. We show that there are two qu...Read more...
July 1997
Eric Maskin, Yingyi Qian and Chenggang Xu
We model organization as the command-and-communication network of managers erected on top of technology (which is modelled as a collection of plants). In our framework, the role of a manager is to deal with shocks that a...Read more...
June 1997
We analyse the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash flows, rather than to divert them. In the first part of the paper we study the optimal debt contract - specifically, the trade-off between the siz...Read more...
January 1997
Jan Eeckhout
The Two-Sided Perfect Matching model is generalised to an Imperfect Matching model with search frictions. A search model is proposed which is characterised by bilateral search and vertical heterogeneity and allows for a ...Read more...
October 1996
Leonardo Felli and J M Villas-Boas
It has been argued that collusion among the members of an organization or a vertical structure creates efficiency losses, and hence should be prevented. This paper shows that whenever collusion takes the form of co-insur...Read more...
September 1996
We identify and investigate the basic ?hold-up? problem which arises whenever each party to a contingent contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plau...Read more...
Oliver Hart, R La Porta Drago, F Lopez-de-Silanes and John Moore
We propose a new bankruptcy procedure that makes use of multiple auctions. The procedure is designed to work even when capital markets do not function well (for example, in developing economies, or in economies in transi...Read more...
Lucien Foldes
In Part A of the present study, subtitled The Consumption Function as Solution of a Boundary Value Problem, Discussion Paper No. TE/96/297, STICERD, London School of Economics, we formulated a Brownian model of accumulat...Read more...
June 1996
Gilles Chemla
This paper analyses the impact of competition among downstream firms on a supplier's investment and on her incentive to vertically integrate. We argue that tougher competition decreases the downstream industry profit, bu...Read more...
1996
Saikat Datta
In this paper we show slow trust building in social relationships in a model of complete information. This model is in contrast to the asymmetric information settings in 'reputation' models of slow trust building. We loo...Read more...
January 1996
This paper looks at connections between Renegotiation Proof Equilibrium sets for finitely and infinitely repeated games. We look at the Benoit and Krishna (1993) definition of renegotiation proof sets for discounted fini...Read more...
Leonardo Felli
Large public bureaucracies are usually less efficient than modern private corporations. This paper explains how the degree of discretionary power might account for this difference in efficiency. In fact, increasing the d...Read more...
A partial competitive equilibrium model is set up for the determination of profit-maximising investment in a production technique which has constant returns to scale itself, but at least one of its inputs has an increasi...Read more...
Programming methods are given for rental valuation of storage and conversion facilities in cyclical, continuous-time pricing problems, e.g. pumped storage of electricity. By identifying the points of differentiability of...Read more...
Many consumption/production processes cannot be interrupted without significant loss of utility/ouput. In continuous-time equilibrium analysis, the structure of the demand for flows that results can lead to prices contai...Read more...
The standard Wong-Viner envelope theorem is of little use in the context of production with multiple outputs because the differentiability assumptions its builds on are so severely restrictive that even the simplest of a...Read more...
Although conditions that exhaust the implications of rationality (homogeneity, symmetry, definiteness) are well known, these apply under a single set of constraints. If a situation can be compared with another situation ...Read more...
We consider a neo-classical model of optimal economic growth with c.r.r.a. utility in which the traditional deterministic trends representing population growth, technological progress, depreciation and impatience are rep...Read more...
March 1996
Sudipto Bhattacharya, L-A Gérard-Varet and Claude d'Aspremont
We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interim research knowledge, between two participants in a R & D race or contest, for an ultimate, patentable invention. Licensing fee schedules, as functions o...Read more...
The paper compares co-operative governance structure to outside ownership. The distinction between the two lies in who has residual rights of control. It is found that a co-operative becomes relatively less efficient as ...Read more...
Maija Halonen
We show that allocation of ownership matters even in a long-term relationship where problems of opportunism are less severe unless agents are very patient. Ownership structure is chosen to give the agents best incentives...Read more...
May 1995
Francisco H.G. Ferreira
This paper proposes a model of wealth distribution dynamics with a capital market imperfection and a production function where public capital is complementary to private capital. A unique invariant steady-state distribut...Read more...
April 1995
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore
This paper is a theoretical study into how credit constraints intereact with aggregate economic activity over the business cycle. We construct a model of a dynamic economy in which lenders cannot force borrowers to repay...Read more...
1995
This paper examines the problem of distilling conflicting interpersonal comparisons into a single set of interpersonal comparisons. The mapping that achieves this has a richer co-domain than all social choice problems (a...Read more...
Espen R. Moen
I study a matching model where heterogeneous firms publicly announce wage offers. A Walrasian type of equilibrium is derived, and the concept of stability used to restrict the set of equilibria. It is shown that the equi...Read more...
Alison Hole and Godfrey Keller
This paper presents a model of a search process for the best outcome of many multi-stage projects. The branching structure of the search environment is such that the pay-offs to various actions are correlated; neverthele...Read more...
1994
We study wage determination in a job-matching model, under the assumption that wages may be continuously renegotiated, so as to reflect the employee's endogenous outside option. We characterize the unique equilibirum of ...Read more...
Classical theories of exchange rates, such as Mint Par and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), have the desirable property that they define a network of exchange rates in which no profit by 'compound arbitration' or 'cyclic a...Read more...
Norman Biggs
Kaushik Basu
The standard algebra of experessing knowledge and common knowledge in game theory is critically examines. It is argued that this algebra is flawed because it assumes implicitly that information partitions of individuals ...Read more...
This paper suggests a reason, other than asymmetric formation, why agency contracts are not explicitly contingent on the contracting parties' performances or actions. This reason is the formal nature of contracts: the fo...Read more...
1993
Stanislaw Gomulka and John Lane
The paper develops and discusses a two-sector general equilibrium growth model of a 'transit economy' which is subjected to an external price shock. The assumed behavioural charactertistic of such an economy is the prese...Read more...
This paper extends the classic two-armed bandit problem to a many-agent setting in which N players each face the same experimentation problem. The difference with the single-agent problem is that agents can now learn fro...Read more...
Patrick Bolton and Christopher Harris
Michael A. Raith
Under which circumstances do oligopolists have an incentive to share private information about a stochastic demand or stochastic costs? We present a general model which includes virtually all models of the existing liter...Read more...
March 1993
Daron Acemoglu
This paper presents a one-sided incomplete (asymmetric) information bargaining game between a firm and a worker embedded in a general equilibrium framework. The model predicts business cycle fluctuations in the economy i...Read more...
Francesca Cornelli
This paper studies the optimal selling procedures for a monopolist, when consumers valuations are unknown and there are fixed costs. The fixed costs introduce a positive externality among customers: each customer benefit...Read more...
1992
Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont
In this paper the internal organisation of firms is reduced to the organisation of a communication network. In the presence of information communication and processing costs it is important to design rules guiding which ...Read more...
Thomas Piketty
We consider an infinite-horizon inter-generational economy with identical agents differing only in their inherited wealth and with a constant-returns-to-scale technology using capital and labour (called 'effort') and dis...Read more...
November 1992
A new and powerful dictatorship result is presented. It is well known that in social choice problems, the negativism of the original Arrow result can be overcome by admitting information based on interpersonal comparison...Read more...
Avinash Dixit
Many recent stochastic dynamic models in economics and finance are based on the theory of Brownian motion and its control or regulation. A heuristic exposition of this theory is presented with emphasis given to Itô's Lem...Read more...
Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart and John Moore
We propose a new bankruptcy procedure. Initially, a firm's debts are cancelled, and cash and non-cash bids are solicited for the 'new' (all-equity) firm. Former claimants are given shares, or options to buy shares, in th...Read more...
George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja
We examine local stability under learning of stationary Markov sunspot equilibria (SSEs) in a simply dynamic nonlinear model. Necessary and sufficient conditions for local convergence of a recursive learning algorithm to...Read more...
Rational expectations as the standard solution concept for dynamic economic models leaves open two fundamental questions: (1) how can RE be attained if agents do not actually begin with RE?, and (2) which RE solution wil...Read more...
Localization techniques which facilitate verification of the topological properties of sets, functions and correspondences needed for equilibrium analysis in infinite-dimensional spaces are given. For example, it is show...Read more...
An extension of Berge's Maximum Theorem is given, with two different topologies on the choice set used for the two semicontinuity assumptions on preferences. It is used to establish the norm-to-weak* continuity of (trunc...Read more...
This paper analyses optimal irreversible investment policy when profits are subject to a multiplicative geometric Brownian motion shock. The marginal product of capital is increasing initially and decreasing thereafter. ...Read more...
May 1992
Alberto Dalmazzo
The paper analyses a simple Rubinstein-type bargaining model in which there is no discounting and the cake decays over time at a positive rate. As a consequence, outside options enter players' unique Perfect Equilibrium ...Read more...
Roger Guesnerie
This paper examines justifications of the rational expectations hypothesis that rely on the analysis of the agents' mental forecasting ('educing') activity which involves 'forecasting the forecasts' of others etc. The co...Read more...
George W. Evans and Roger Guesnerie
We examine the connection between two stability concepts of rational expectations equilibria: expectational stability, based on the convergence of iterations of expectations, and strong rationality, based on uniqueness o...Read more...
We examine a recursive algorithm for learning steady states and cycles in stochastic nonlinear models. Necessary and sufficient conditions for local convergence are shown to be equivalent to easily computable expectation...Read more...
John Moore
There are two parts to this paper. Part One introduces the subject of implementation, and provides applications (in particular, to the theory of contracts). This part is written so as to be accessible to the general read...Read more...
1991
The thesis of this paper is that human capital is inalienable: it cannot be bought or sold. Control of physical capital proved the means by which one agent influences another. That is, the pattern of property rights over...Read more...
Consider an entrepreneur whocneeds to raise funds from an investor, but cannot commit not to withdraw his human capital from the project. The possibility of a default or quit puts an upper bound on the total indebtedness...Read more...
Bewley's programme of excluding price singularities in equilibrium solutions for commodity spaces of bounded functions is reconsidered. From two recent examples in which singularities are indispensable, viz., marginal co...Read more...
Using subdifferentials we develop a marginal-analytical approach to equilibrium and use it in the commodity space L? to derive new results on the representation of prices by a density. Apart from conferring advantages wh...Read more...
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Akihiko Matsui and Kiminori Matsuyama
Read more...
George W. Evans, Seppo Honkapohja and Thomas J. Sargent
Aditya Goenka
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and Randall Wright
1990
Ariel Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky
Steve Alpern and Dennis J. Snower
1989
Max Steuer
J.V. Howard
George W. Evans and Gary Ramey
Carolyn Pitchik
Klaus M. Schmidt
Dilip Abreu, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Andrew Caplin and Barry Nalebuff
Steve Alpern
Abhinay Muthoo
David Canning
1988
Ariel Rubinstein
Roy O. Davies, Stanislaw Gomulka and Adam Ostaszewski
John Moore and Rafael Repullo
Diane J. Reyniers
Ken Binmore
Ken Binmore and Adam Brandenburger
1987
Avner Shaked
Steve Alpern and Shmuel Gal
Avner Shaked and John Sutton
Tilman Börgers
Ching-to Ma
Dilip Abreu and Ariel Rubinstein
Ching-to Ma and John Moore
1986
1985
John Sutton
Ken Binmore, Avner Shaked and John Sutton
Xavier Martinez
Martin Hellwig
Ken Binmore and M.J. Herrero
Giacomo Bonanno
Ken Binmore, Ariel Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky
1984
Douglas Gale and Martin Hellwig
Meghnad Desai
Oliver Hart and David Kreps
October 1986
Wolfgang Leininger
Menahem E. Yaari
Douglas Gale
Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart
1983
John Lane and Wolfgang Leininger
Oliver Hart
Ariel Rubinstein and Menahem E. Yaari
Anthony Horsley
Rafael Repullo
Partha Dasgupta
1982
Steve Alpern and M. Asic
V.P. Crawford
Dilip Mookherjee
Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin
Partha Dasgupta, Richard Gilbert and Joseph Stiglitz
Y.Y. Papageorgiou and J.F. Thisse
Joel Sobel
Hugo Sonnenschein
Mukul Majumdar and Manfred Nermuth
J. Jaskold Gabszewicz, Avner Shaked, John Sutton and J.F. Thisse
1981
Yoshiaki Ushio
Joseph Greenberg
Yoshiyasu Ono
Richard Jackman and John Sutton
1980
Partha Dasgupta and Joseph Stiglitz
Roger Guesnerie and C. Oddou
Core-like solution concepts based on stable coalition structures are studied in the context of games which are not necessarily superadditive. It is shown that a simple economic model involving local public goods financed...Read more...
1979